Dale Anderson v. Robert S. Farr and D. Aron Stanton : Unknown by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2000
Dale Anderson v. Robert S. Farr and D. Aron
Stanton : Unknown
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
David C. Anderson; Attorney for Appellee.
Daniel A. Stanton; Aron Stanton, PC; Attorney for Appellant.
This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Anderson v. Farr, No. 20000224.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2000).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/440
CUMENT 
U 
9 
I 
UTAH SUPKtMt U U U K I 
BRIEB 
CKET w» 2J>OOOIZ$!SC 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
DALE ANDERSON, 
Plaintiff - Appellee - Respondent 
vs. 
ROBERT S. FARR and D. ARON 
STANTON, 
Defendants 
D. ARON STANTON, 
Appellant/Petitioner. 
PETITIONER'S REPLY BRIEF 
Docket No. 20000224-SC 
(Classification No. 15) 
Ut.Ct.App.No. 98-1779<:A 
Circuit No. 94-0013022 (Murray) 
Circuit No. 94-0014634 (Salt Lake) 
District No. 39-0907678 (Salt Lake) 
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER DANIEL A. STANTON 
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
FROM THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
AFFIRMING A FINAL JUDGMENT OF THE 
THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, MURRAY DEPT. 
DAVID C. ANDERSON, #82 
Attorney for Appellee/Respondent 
505 East 200 South, #400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 533-9400 
DATED: 19 June 2000. 
DANIEL A. STANTON, #3077 
ARON STANTON, P. C , 
Attorney for Appellant/Petitioner 
1450 East Highland Cove Lane, #310 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Telephone: (801) 424-3570 £ ^ 1 I C [ 
J'JH 1 9 
XthK 6UPfiEME CC 
UTAH 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
DALE ANDERSON, ] 
Plaintiff - Appellee - Respondent ] 
vs. 
ROBERT S. FARR and D. ARON ) 
STANTON, ; 
Defendants 
D. ARON STANTON, ) 
Appellant/Petitioner. ] 
\ PETITIONER'S REPLY BRIEF 
) Docket No. 20000224-SC 
) (Classification No. 15) 
) Ut.Ct.App.No. 98-1779-CA 
) Circuit No. 94-0013022 (Murray) 
I Circuit No. 94-0014634 (Salt Lake) 
> District No. 89-0907678 (Salt Lake) 
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER DANIEL A. STANTON 
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
FROM THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
AFFIRMING A FINAL JUDGMENT OF THE 
THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, MURRAY DEFT. 
DAVID C. ANDERSON, #82 DANIEL A. STANTON, #3077 
Attorney for Appellee/Respondent ARON STANTON, P. C , 
505 East 200 South, #400 Attorney for Appellant/Petitioner 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 1450 East Highland Cove Lane, #310 
Telephone: (801) 533-9400 Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Telephone: (801) 424-3570 
DATED: 19 June 2000. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . . . i 
TABLE OF CASES, STATUTES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES , n 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ii 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES: 
ISSUE 1 
Did the trial court commit reversible error by proceeding to try this case in 
the absence of subject-matter jurisdiction notwithstanding Stanton's oral and 
written objections based on the evidence that this case was: (1) previously 
ordered dismissed by the District Court for failure of prosecution; (2) never 
properly reinstated; (3) ordered transferred post-dismissal to the Murray 
Circuit Court by the District Court in sole reliance upon Plaintiff's ex parte 
"ORDER duplicate'7 executed more than four years later and more than 
nineteen months after the statute of limitations had expired, all without 
motion or notice to Stanton and without opportunity for hearing? 
ISSUE 2 
Did the Court of Appeals err by: (1) failing to consider the post-dismissal 
subject-matter jurisdiction issue; (2) upholding the trial court's determination 
of jurisdiction; (3) denying Stanton's petition for hearing to reconsider that 
jurisdictional issue; and (4) failing to grant Stanton's motion for Rule 11 
sanctions? 
ARGUMENT IN REPLY 1 
CONCLUSION 4-5 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
i 
TABLE OF CASES, STATUTES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES 
CASES: 
Curtis v. Curtis. 789 P.2d 717 (Ut.Ct.App., 1990) 4 
Barlow \.Cappa. 821 P.2d 465 (Ut.Ct.App., 1991) 4 
Helman v. Paterson. 121 Utah 332,241 P.2d 910 (1952) 2 
Ludlow v. Colorado Animal By-Products Co.. 104 Utah 221,137 P.2d 345 (1943) 2 
MaxfieU's Lessee v. Levy. (I), 4 Dall. (U.S.) 308,311-12 (1797) 5 
Thompson v. Jackson. 743 P.2d 1230 (Ut.Ct.App., 1987) 3,4 
Rimensburger v, Rimensburger. 841 P.2d 709 (Ut.Ct.App., 1992) 4 
State Dept of Social Services v. Vijil. 784 P.2d 1130 (Utah, 1989) 4 
Van Per Stappen v. Van Per Stappen. 815 P.2d 1335 (Ut.Ct.App., 1991) 3 
West Gallery Corp. v. Salt Lake City Board of Cotnm'rs.. 537 P.2d 1027 (Utah, 1975) , 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Daniel A. Stanton, Appellant/Petitioner herein {"Stanton,r), readopts his original 
statement of the ease and statement of facts as set forth in his petition ("Petition") at pp. 
2-8. Stanton objects to the statement of the case set forth in the brief in oppositon {"Brief") 
filed by Dale Anderson, Appellee/Respondent herein ("Anderson"), to the extent it omits 
a n d / o r misstates material facts necessary for this Court to reach an equitable deter-
mination of the sole issue presented for review, that of subject-matter jurisdiction. 
Specifically, Anderson's statement of the case (Brief, at 10) fails, inter alia, to state 
the fact that this case was ordered dismissed by the District Court for cause on 31 August 
1990, or eight (8) months after first being filed on 22 December 1989. It misstates the date 
ii 
of trial as being 14 November 1995, when in fact trial was held earlier on 2 October 1995. 
However, the date of the ex parte "ORDER (duplicate)" prepared by Anderson's counsel 
and subsequently signed by District Judge Rigtrup was 14 November 1994. 
Moreover, this case was not filed by "Appellant/7 as is confusingly misstated at the 
outset, nor is "Appellee" (Dale Anderson) a licensed attorney in this state. 
APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
The gravamen of Stanton's petition for a writ of certiorari is based upon the simple,, 
singular issue of whether this case ceased to exist from on and after 24 August 1990 
following its involuntary dismissal ordered by the District Court for cause, and dated and 
filed as such on 31 August 1990.1 Then and thereafter the burden was plainly incumbent 
upon Anderson to prove that his case was timely, and properly, reinstated pursuant to the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and particularly in the face of being squarely challenged on 
that point at every stage of the proceedings. 
Anderson has never done so at any time since, and nothing contained in the record 
of this case nor in his instant Brief opposing this Petition establishes to the contrary, with 
legal sufficiency of evidence, to overcome the jurisdictional issue stemming from the 
existence of that dismissal order which can no longer continue to be brushed aside. 
Nevertheless, Appellee Anderson merely continues to reiterate the procedural and 
judicial advantages of invited error which resulted from on and after 14 November 1994 — 
some four years and three months after that dismissal order had been filed — when his 
1
 ^ePet i t ion Appendix, Exhibits no. 5 and 6, respectively evidencing the order to 
show cause, dated 17 July 1990, and the order of dismissal, dated 31 August 1990. 
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counsel. Attorney David C Anderson, somehow managed to obtain Judge Rigtrup's 
signature on the self-prepared, ex parte "ORDER (duplicate)''' of even date 2 which gave 
rise to the jurisdictional issue now earnestly sought to be reviewed by this Court. 
At no place in his Brief is that order of dismissal squarely addressed in relation to 
such conclusive evidence, the existence of which clearly operated to deprive the trial court 
of jurisdiction of the cause as well as over the person of Stanton. And because it is equally 
clear that the jurisdictional issue did not arise until after that invited error was effected, it 
misconstrues the facts for Anderson to state that Stanton's original answer at the time the 
case was tiled, *'...[d]id not raise jurisdiction/' ^ This can only imply that Anderson also 
considers moot Stanton's jurisdictional argument which arose from the dismissal order. 
As the invited error in this case has thus far resulted in not only procedural, but 
substantia!, due process violations and a gross miscarriage of justice,, it is appropriate to 
review this Court's denunciation of invited error for at least fifty years. For example, in 
Hehnan v. Vaierson, 121 Utah 332, 241 P.2d 910, 913 (1952), this Court said: 
"In the case of Ludlow v» Colorado Animal By-Products Company 104 Utah 
221,137 P 2d 345, 347 (1943), we said: 'A party who takes a position which 
either leads a court into error or by conduct approves the error committed by 
the court, cannot later take advantage of such error in procedure' . . / \ 
More recently, in West Gallery Corp. v. Salt Lake City B£ o/Com'rs., 537 R2d 1027,1028 
(Utah, 1975), the statement of this Court was equally analogous to the facts of this case: 
"The suggestion of mootness on the part of the City is mute evidence that it 
has attempted to shift its own abortive procedures onto the shoulders of the 
District Court,../'. 
~ See Petition Appendix, Exhibit no. 7, 
3
 Brief, VIII. Statement of Case, opening paragraph, at 10> 
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In this case, the similarly abortive procedures resulting from the invited error 
effected by Attorney Anderson's 14 November 1994 "ORDER (duplicate)/7 were carefully 
calculated to produce the circumstances which presently exist. Indeed, the very existence 
of that "ORDER (duplicate)" itself provides credible evidence of the fact that Anderson 
knew his case had never been properly reinstituted or there would have been no need for 
its languge stating: "...[t]he prior order of the court is set aside../7. But even so, it makes 
no statement that such "prior order" was, in fact, the order of dismissal of 31 August 1990, 
much less how that order of dismissal could be "set aside" so long after the applicable 
statutes of limitation had run. Of equal importance is the question whether the District 
Court even had jurisdiction to execute Anderson's "ORDER (duplicate)" at all where the 
operative effect of the dismissal itself served to divest the court of jurisdiction of the cause 
more than four years earlier. How that problem was overcome is not stated. 
Anderson elsewhere takes issue with Stanton's citing of TJtompson v. Jfickson, 743 
R2d 1230 (UtCt. App., 1987) as a singular case demonstrating the consequences of a court's 
action taken in the absence of jurisdiction and argues, unconvincingly, that the facts in this 
case are "...[n]ot the same point as the Thompson case." 4 Under this ill-founded theory, 
neither could divorce cases, for example, be cited as precedent for jurisdiction in cases 
unrelated to divorce, either, as is common practice in the rendering of judicial opinions. 
A brief examination reveals that this is so. In Van Per Stappen v. Van DerStappen, 
815 R2d 1335,1337 ( U t C t App., 1991), for example, the court said: "...a judgment is void 
when entered by a court that lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the controversy, and 
4
 Brief, paragraphs 4-6, at 12. 
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must be set aside under Utah R.Civ.R 60(b)(5)/' citing, State Pepf of Social Sews, v. Vijil, 
784 R2d 1130, 1132 (Utah, 1989). In Rimensburger v. Rimensburger. 841 P.2d 709, 710 
( U t C t App v 1992), the court again said: "The question of whether a court has subject 
matter jurisdiction 'goes to the very power of a court to entertain an action/ Curtis v. 
Curtis. 789 P.2d 717, 726 (UtCt Appv 1990). Consequently, we review this question of law 
independently and do not defer to the trial court/7 citing Barlow v. Cappa, 821 P.2d 465, 
466 ( U t C t App v 1991), and Van Per Siappen, supra. Thus, as Tfiompson, supra, was 
sufficient, and particularly appropriate, to cite for authority relating to the determination 
of jurisdictional issues, such as are presented here, Anderson's argument has no merit. 
Anderson also argues, misleadingly, concerning Stanton's request for Rule 11 
sanctions stating, in pertinent part, that: 
"He [Stanton] appears to argue that even though the trial court denied Ms 
argument to dismiss on three separate occasions, and the Court of Appeals 
also denied relief, that Appellee's counsel should determine that the courts 
were in error and dismiss the complaint regardless of what his client 
desired/' 5 
To the contrary, Stanton seeks sanctions against Anderson's counsel not for the 
reasons just cited, but for the ultimate results effected over the course of a full decade by 
means of Counsel's material acts and omissions and plain invited error, the facts of which 
are self-evident throughout Stanton's Petition and summarized at page 17 thereof. 
CONCLUSION 
Because legal effect of the order of dismissal by the District Court, duly entered in 
the record on 31 August 1990, clearly operated to existinguish the existence of Anderson's 
5
 Brief, paragraph 12, at 13. 
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case absent some timely action by him to properly reinstate it, and because this case was 
only //reinstituted// by means of the invited error of Anderson's counsel in unconscionably 
obtaining, ex parte, the services of the District Court more than four years later by "shifting 
[his] own abortive procedures onto its shoulders/ ' and because Anderson's counsel's 
"ORDER (duplicate)" of 14 November 1994 constitutes credible evidence that he plainly 
knew that his client's case had been so dismissed as a result of his own dilatory conduct, 
and because of the amazing fact that no less than three courts and seven judges below 
during the course of the past decade have thus far failed to give cognizance to the 
fundamental issue of subject matter jurisdiction in this case, and because jurisdiction is 
absolutely and unequivocally essential to a court's power to act, these are, indeed (contrary 
to Anderson's assertion), "special and important reasons presented in the petition for the 
granting of the wri t" 
THEREFORE AND ACCORDINGLY, Stanton hereby respectfully requests that his 
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari be granted in the good-faith belief that there yet remains 
one Court within the entire State of Utah that will finally understand the subject-matter 
jurisdiction issue in this case. For, as the U. S. Supreme Court stated 200 years ago: 
"No Court in America ever yet thought, nor, I hope, ever Hill, of acquiring 
jurisdiction by fiction. ...It is evident that we are not to assume a voluntary 
jurisdiction, because we think, or others may think, it may be exercised 
innocently, or even wisely. The court is not to fix the bounds of its own 
jurisdiction,, according to its own discretion. A jurisdiction assumed without 
authority, would be equally an usurpation, whether exercised wisely, or 
unwisely/' Maxfield^Lessee v. Levy. (I), 4 DalL (U.S.) 308, 311-12 (1797). 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this the 19th day of June, 200(1 
inJ^pp^lIarit/Petitioner 
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